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Among the macroeconomic variables that  the empirical growth literature  has
identified as being highly correlated  with  growth performance  across coun-
tries are the level of financial development and the degree of openness.'  There
is also  a large  literature  that  studies  the  issue of causality  and  the  chan-
nels through  which both financial development and openness affect economic
growth.2 This  paper  explores a possible  link between financial development
and the structure  of the trade balance. Specifically, it analyzes theoretically  a
channel through  which the economy-wide level of external finance determines
the trade  balance in manufactures.  It  then  assesses the empirical  validity of
this  theoretical  model in a 30-year panel  of 65 countries.
This paper builds on theoretical  work by Kletzer and Bardhan  (1987) who
show that  countries  with  a relatively  well-developed financial sector have a
comparative  advantage in industries  and sectors that  rely on external finance.
We extend  their  work by allowing both  sectors to  use external  finance, one
being more credit  intensive due to  increasing  returns  to  scale. Furthermore,
we test the hypothesis  derived from both  Kletzer  and Bardhan  and our work
by  exploring  the  impact  that  financial  development  has  on the  structure
of the trade  balance,  specifically, on the  export  share  and  trade  balance in
*Helpful  comments from Marianne Baxter, Robert Cull, Bob King, Ross Levine, Nor-
man Loayza, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the University of Vir-
ginia, the World Bank, the University of California  at Davis and the Annual Meeting of the
Southern Economic  Association  are gratefully acknowledged.  The usual disclaimer applies.
The findings,  interpretations and conclusions  in this paper are entirely those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or
the countries they represent.
1manufactures.
Exploring  the link between financial  development  and trade  in manufac-
tures is interesting for several reasons. First,  if we find that  the level of finan-
cial development  does have an effect on the  structure  of the trade  balance,
this  underlines the  importance  of financial sector development for economic
development  beyond  its  positive  impact  on economic growth  and  therefore
increases  the  priority  that  financial  sector  reforms  should  have on  policy
makers'  agendas.
Second, exploring the links between financial development  and the struc-
ture of international  trade  also has implications for the theory of international
trade. The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts trade flows based on an economy's
endowments of labor, land and physical capital. In the Ricardian model tech-
nological differences across countries  explain  international  trade  flows. This
paper  explores theoretically  and  empirically whether  cross-country  variance
in the level of financial development helps predict  trade flows, where financial
services can be interpreted  either  as part  of the production  technology or as
determining  the level of physical capital  in the economy.
Finally,  a possible  link between financial  development  and  international
trade  has policy implications.  On the  one hand,  reforming the financial sec-
tor  might  have implications  for the  trade  balance  if the  level of financial
development  is a determinant  of countries'  comparative  advantage.  On the
other hand, the effect of trade reforms on the level and structure  of the trade
balance might depend on the  level of financial development.
While there  is a large variety  of possible  links between financial develop-
ment and international  trade,  this  paper focuses on just  one. It concentrates
2on the ability of the financial sector to  channel savings to  the private  sector
and therefore help overcome liquidity constraints.  This enables the economy
to specialize and exploit  economies of scale. Economies with  a better  devel-
oped financial system  and a higher level of external finance should therefore
have a comparative  advantage  in sectors  that  exhibit  high  scale economies.
This  link, however, might  also  be  demand-driven,  so that  economies with
higher export  shares  in  sectors with  scale economies have better  developed
financial systems.  There  might  finally  be  a third  factor;  distortionary  gov-
ernment  policies might impede  both  the  development  of the financial sector
and keep the economy relatively  closed. While the theoretical  model explores
this  one channel through  which financial  development  affects the structure
of trade,  the empirical  part  controls for possible reverse causality  and simul-
taneity  bias.
The  theoretical  part  presents  the  model of an  open  economy with  two
production  technologies,  one with  constant  returns  to  scale (food)  and the
other  with  increasing  returns  to  scale  (manufacturing).  Producers  of both
goods will augment  their  capital  with  debt  from savers. Market  frictions in
the form of asymmetric  information  will give rise to financial intermediaries.
Financial intermediaries  incur search costs when channeling savings to entre-
preneurs. Financial  development is modelled as lowering the search costs and
thus  increasing the  level of external  finance in the  economy. Since financial
development shifts incentives of the producers towards the good with increas-
ing returns  to scale, the  intersectoral  specialization,  and  therefore  structure
of the trade  flows, is determined  by the  relative level of financial intermedi-
ation.  All else equal, economies with a better  developed financial system  are
3net exporters  of the good with increasing  returns  to scale.
Our empirical test  builds on the  assumption that  the production  of man-
ufactured  goods exhibits higher scale economies than  the production  of agri-
cultural goods or the provision of services. As indicators  of trade  in manufac-
tured  goods we will use manufactured  exports,  imports  and their  difference
relative  to  GDP  and  the  share  of manufactured  exports  (imports)  in  total
merchandise exports  (imports).  As the  main  indicator  of financial  develop-
ment  we will use credit  to  the  private  sector by deposit  money  banks  and
other financial intermediaries  as share  of GDP.
We test the hypothesis that  countries with a higher level of financial devel-
opment have higher export shares and trade balances in manufactured  goods
in a sample of 65 countries over the period  1966-95, using both  cross-country
and panel estimations.  To control for biases introduced  by country-specific ef-
fects, reverse causality and simultaneity,  we will use traditional  cross-country
GMM techniques and recent dynamic panel techniques, proposed by Arellano
and  Bond (1991) and Arellano and  Bover (1995).
The  results  are very  clear.  Countries  with  a  better-developed  financial
system have a higher export share and trade  balance in manufactured  goods.
These results  are consistent  across cross-country  and  panel estimations.  We
conduct  a series of robustness  tests  that  confirm these results.
The remainder  of this  paper  is organized  as follows. Section 2 presents  a
theoretical  model of financial development  and  international  trade.  Section
3 discusses the  empirical  link  between  financial development  and  different
indicators  of trade  in  manufactured  goods  using  cross-country  and  panel
estimations.  Section 4 concludes.
42  A Theoretical  Model  of Finance  and Trade
This section presents  a theoretical  model that  elucidates one channel through
which the level of financial development affects production decisions and both
the level and  structure  of international  trade.  The model focuses on the role
of finance in mobilizing savings and  facilitating  large-scale and  high-return
projects.  The producers  of the  good with  increasing  returns  to  scale profit
from a higher  level of financial  development  more than  producers  of other
goods, since a  higher level of external  finance  allows them  to  exploit  scale
economies. This results in a higher production  and trade  balance of this good
in total  output  in economies with  a better  developed financial system.3
The  economy  is populated  by  a  continuum  of agents  that  live for two
periods.  Each generation  is normalized  to  unity. Agents  are born  endowed
with  capital  and with  the ability to  run  a production  technology  that  turns
capital  into consumption  goods. Young agents use their  capital  in the  first
period  to run  firms and divide the resulting  income qk between  first-period
consumption  and savings, where q is the return  on equity.
At  the beginning  of their  second  life period  agents deposit  their  savings
with  financial intermediaries  and  earn interest  R =  1 + iD, which they  con-
sume  at the  end of their  lives. In the following we will denote  agents of the
young generation as entrepreneurs  and  agents of the old generation as savers.
In the  following we will first  describe  the  inter-  and  intra-temporal  con-
sumer problem  and the production  technologies in both  sectors. Then finan-
cial  intermediation  in both  sectors  is discussed,  and  the  equilibrium  in the
loan market  derived. Finally,  general  equilibria  in the  closed and  the  open
economy are described.
52.1  The  Consumers
All agents have ex-ante identical logarithmic  preferences and a constant  sub-
jective discount factor. They maximize the following two-period utility func-
tion at the  beginning of their  lifetime:
U = max{ln(C)  +  3ln(C')}  (1)
subject  to the  budget constraint:
C'  = (qk-C)R  (2)
This yields the following first period consumption:
C =  lq  ,B(3)
The logarithmic  preferences result in a constant  saving rate.4
The intertemporal  consumption-saving  decision is followed by the intratem-
poral decision about  the  composition  of the  consumption  bundle.  The  con-
sumption  bundle  consists  of two  goods:  a  homogenous  good  x,  food,  and
manufactured  goods yj that  are produced  in different varieties.5
C =  6(  yjydj)l  a  (4)
Due to  the  Cobb-Douglas  form of the  consumption  function,  the  consumer
will spend the share 4 of the consumption  budget  on food and the share  1-  6
on manufactured  goods.6 Assuming 0 < a  < 1, consumers always prefer more
varieties of manufactures  over less. The demand  functions for food and for a
variety of manufactured  goods are:
6x = 6(C + C')  (5)
(1 - 6)(C  + C)  (6)
1  f
pj  -a  f=0  pJi7i 0 di
where pj is the relative price of variety j  of manufactured  goods. The price of
food is normalized to 1. Given that  a continuum  of varieties is produced, the
price elasticity of a variety of manufactures  yj is 1  Te  Since all manufactured
varieties enter  demand  symmetrically, in equilibrium pj = p.
2.2  The  Producers
Each period entrepreneurs  have access to a stochastic  production  technology
that  enables them  to produce either  food x or a variety  yj of manufactured
goods.
x = zi =z(k  + I)  (7)
y  =  azi-T  = az(k + I)-T  (8)
where k is the  entrepreneur's  equity, 1 are loans supplied by financial inter-
mediaries as described  below and  z is a firm-specific shock with  a uniform
distribution  function  F(z)  =  ',  support  between  0 and  b and  an  expected
value  f  =  fJ  zdF(z)  =  2. T are start-up  costs, which are considered sunk cost
thereafter,  and a  >  1 is a productivity  parameter  that  makes the production
of manufactures  more efficient than  food production.7
7Whereas the production  of food exhibits constant  returns  to scale, the pro-
duction  process for manufactured  goods exhibits increasing returns  to scale.
Since manufacturing  entrepreneurs  can differentiate  their  products  without
costs and all manufactured  goods enter demand symmetrically, each firm will
specialize in a different good.
Before production,  entrepreneurs  and  intermediaries  will enter  into debt
contracts  as described  in  the  next  section.  Entrepreneurs  will also engage
in mutual  insurance  contracts  to  diversify their  production  risk. 8 After pro-
duction  has been  completed,  each producer  observes  privately  output  and
repays  debt  according to  the  contract.  Finally,  the  informational  asymme-
try  is resolved, producers  can observe each other's  output  and the insurance
agreements are honored.
2.3  Financial  Intermediation  and  the  Optimal  Debt
Contract
Entrepreneurs  face two  market  frictions  when  they  try  to  augment  their
equity  with  debt.  First,  they  are  informationally  isolated  from  savers,  so
that  the realization of the firm-specific shock can be observed by savers only
through  a costly state  verification  process.  Second, savers face search  costs
that  are modelled as iceberg  costs; only part  of the savings can be actually
used by the entrepreneurs  as capital.  The  asymmetric  information  between
savers and entrepreneurs  gives rise to financial intermediaries  that  can inter-
nalize the agency problem and diversify the risk perfectly for savers. Whereas
the  verification costs determine  only the  costs of external  finance, the  level
of search costs determines  both  costs and  level of external  finance available
8to entrepreneurs. Any saver can become an intermediary and banks act in a
perfectly competitive environment.
Entrepreneurs and intermediaries  will enter into a Standard Debt Contract
that  specifies  the amount of the loan, the states in which verification  takes
place and the repayment the firm has to make in different  states. 9 This con-
tract maxirmizes  the firm's profit and ensures that  the zero-profit condition
for the intermediary holds. The loan size will depend linearly on the firm's
equity. The state will be verified  whenever  the entrepreneur claims that out-
put  is too low to pay the  fixed repayment due in nonverified states.  The
intermediary  recovers  the remaining output after having paid for verification
costs that are proportional to output. The truth-telling constraint in the op-
timal debt problem will ensure that  the entrepreneur will always announce
the true state.
2.3.1  The Optimal Debt  Contract  for Food Producers
Defining -y, as the fixed repayment per unit invested in nonverified  states,
R  =  l+iD  the interest rate on deposits and A  the verification  cost, the optimal
debt contract is the result of the entrepreneur's maximization problem:' 0
max ((k  + 1)  (9)
- 2b
subject to
(k + 1)[  2b  +  ±  b  R  b  R, k given  (10)
Equation (9) maximizes  the firm's output; since the intermediary recovers
the remaining  output in the verified  states, the expression  equals the expected
9value of (z - -y)  for values between -y and b times the probability  that  z >  y/.
Equation  (10)  is  the  intermediary's  financing  constraint.  Loans  are  fi-
nanced with deposits  that  pay a gross interest  of R - an endogenous variable
to be determined in equilibrium. The interest  rate has to be paid over (1-s)-I
of the loan sum, since the fraction  s of savings is lost through  search costs.
The first term  on the LHS denotes the verified states,  in which the interme-
diary  recovers the  remaining output  after having paid for verification  costs,
the second term  the fixed repayment  of -y, that  the intermediary  receives per
unit  invested in nonverified states.
Next, we define the intermediary's  expected  return  per  unit invested.
J(Y) Y2'(1  A)  -y.(b-y.)  (1
Equation  (10) can now be rewritten  as follows:
(k + l)J(-yx)  > R  R, k  given  (12)
As shown in the  appendix there  is a unique  yx that  solves the optimal  debt
contract  and that  is independent  of the level of equity. The loan size is linear
in equity  and  the  debt contract  thus  independent  of the  equity level of the
entrepreneur.
2.3.2  The  Optimal  Debt  Contract  for  Manufacturing  Producers
The  debt contract  for the  manufacturing  entrepreneur  is derived very simi-
larly as for the food producer. Defining ap-yy as the fixed repayment  per unit
invested in  nonverified states,  the  optimal  debt  contract  can be  formulated
as follows: 1`
10max  (z  _YY  )2 (kI)  (13)
7W-  2b
subject  to
p(k + I)[  2b  +  b  R  ]  1  s  R, k  given  (14)
Defining the  intermediary's  expected return  per unit  invested apJ(yy)  as
for food producers,  the intermediary's  constraint  can be rewritten  as follows:
1
ap(k  + 1)J(-y) > R1 R, k  given  (15)
As in the  food sector, there  is a  unique  yrY  that  solves the  optimal  debt
contract and that  is independent  of the level of equity. The loan size is linear
in equity and  the  debt  contract  therefore  independent  of the  equity of the
entrepreneur.
2.3.3  Equilibrium  in the  Loan  Sector
We can now define the  equilibrium  in the  loan market.  We denote  with  e)
the aggregate debt share  in the economy  L+K  and  with  qi, i = x, y the debt
share in the food and the  manufacturing  sector, respectively.  Since L is the
share of savings not  lost in search costs, the share  of savings in total  assets
and  the  search  cost  s fix the  debt  share  in  our  economy and  thus  for the
individual food and manufacturing  entrepreneurs,  since the optimal contract
is independent  of the individual  wealth.
In equilibrium  -y., yy, and R will be determined  endogenously, so that  the
non-profit conditions for intermediaries  (10) and  (14) hold with equality and
the aggregate equity-debt ratio is consistent with wealth shares. Furthermore,
11the deposit interest  rate has to be the same on debt contracts  with food and
with  manufacturing  producers.  The  equilibrium  in the  loan  market  can be
described by the following equations,  which determine  -yr, y,, O. and O.,.
R,(( =) (1 -s)  =  (16) R. -y.,)_
RP __  - s) =y  (17) R,, (-/) 
R.('y)  =  R,(-y)  (18)
0O." + (l  O)Oj =b  (D  (19)
where 9 is the share of assets in the food sector in total  assets in the economy.
The returns  on equity for the two classes of entrepreneurs  can be written
as follows:
q,  (z1  - 2 (20)
i  I~2b
ap  (Z  - 7) 2 T
1  - by  2b  k  (21)
Whereas  q,  is independent  of the  equity  level, q 1 is increasing  in equity. If
T  is  sufficiently small,  there  will always  be  manufacturing  entrepreneurs.
Producers  in both  sectors will always prefer to produce rather  than  to forego
the  production  opportunity  and  will always prefer production  with  debt  to
production  in autarchy.  As shown in the appendix,  yyy  >  y,  and,  therefore,
the debt share in the manufacturing  sector is higher than  in the food sector.
122.4  Equilibrium  in a Closed  Economy
In  equilibrium  loan, product  and  factor  markets  have to  clear.  Having de-
scribed the loan market  equilibrium  in the previous subsection,  we will first
present  the  conditions  for the  product  and  factor  markets  and  then  define
the equilibrium.
Since the production  function  for food exhibits  constant  returns  to scale,
marginal and  average costs (cz,, c2)have to equal its  price." 2
c.(Qy)  =  c..  =  (1 - g%)q. + O.J('y.)  =  1  (22)
Since the manufacturing  sector is characterized  by monopolistic competition,
marginal cost equals marginal revenue.'3
up =  cyy  =  (1 - oy)qy  +  cyapJ(7y)  (23)
IFee entry  drives profits  down to  zero, so that  in equilibrium  average  costs
equal price:
p = cy  =  (1 - oy)qy  + OyapJ('y1) + T/y  (24)
The shares of the entrepreneurs  in both  sectors have to add up to one and
the entrepreneurs  have to be indifferent between producing in the food or in
the  manufacturing  sector.
qy  =  qx  (25)
Equations  (22)-(25) specify the long-run  equilibrium conditions  for firms.
To obtain  equilibrium  in the product  markets,  the relative  demand  for food




We can now state  the equilibrium  result  for the closed economy.
Theorem  1  In  equilibrium there will be a  unique solution for x, y,  p, qx, 9,
y;, -y,, O  and Oy which is defined by (16)-(19) and (22)-(26). The share of
entrepreneurs  in  manufacturing  decreases in  the  search costs for  financial
interynediaries.
As shown in the  appendix,  lower search costs increase the return  for en-
trepreneurs  in the  manufacturing  sector more than  in the food sector. Man-
ufacturing  entrepreneurs  profit more from  a higher level of external  finance
and  therefore  physical  capital  since they  can exploit  scale economies. Food
producers  also profit from a higher debt share,  but  not  from the higher cap-
ital stock that  it implies. Financial  development  in the form of lower search
costs will therefore  shift the production  incentives in favor of manufacturing
goods resulting  in a larger manufacturing  sector.
2.5  Equilibrium  in an Open  Economy
Consider  now a world of two countries  that  have identical  size, preferences
and  technologies. They only differ in levels of financial development,  deter-
mined by search costs s. There will be two sets of equilibrium  conditions,  as
defined by (16)-(19) and  (22)-(25).
In the following we will concentrate  on equilibria with no sectoral  special-
ization,  so that  both  economies produce  food  and  manufactured  goods. In
14the presence of frictionless international  trade,  all varieties of manufactured
goods are available to domestic  consumers.  Domestic and foreign producers
will produce  different varieties,  so that,  independent  of intersectoral  trade,
there  will be intrasectoral  trade  in manufactured  goods.
The  equilibrium  condition  in  the  world-wide  goods  market  can  be  de-
scribed as follows:
x + X*  - P  (27)
Yy  1-E*
where * denotes the  foreign country.
The efficiency of the financial sector relative  to  the rest  of the world de-
termines  the  comparative  advantage of the economy and  therefore the  com-
position of the trade  flows.
Theorem  2  If,  everything else equal, the domestic financial  intermediaries
face  higher search costs than  the rest  of the  world, the  economy will be an
exporter of food and a net importer of manufactured goods.
This result  corresponds  to the predictions  of a Ricardian  trade  model. A
well-developed financial system  translates  into a technological  advantage in
the production  of manufacturing  goods. Countries with  a high level of finan-
cial development therefore  have a comparative  advantage  in manufacturing.
A more efficient financial  system  therefore  not  only  increases  the  relative
production  share of manufactured  goods, as in the closed economy, but  also
the export share  and  the trade  balance.
This  result  also  corresponds  to  the  conclusions  derived  by Kletzer  and
Bardhan  (1987). In their  models the  country  with  the  higher cost of credit
15or more credit  rationing  imports  the good whose production  requires exter-
nal  finance  and  exports  the  good with  no need of external  finance.  While
Kletzer and Bardhan  model differences in credit  markets  by either variation
in the perceived default  probability  of the borrowing country or variation  in
verification costs, we model the differences in the efficiency of intermediating
funds from savers to borrowers.
We can interpret  this result  also in the context  of the  "new trade  theory".
If both  countries are of the same size, the country with the lower search costs
will have the larger capital  stock.  This  allows this  country to  better  exploit
scale economies and therefore translates  into a comparative  advantage in the
good with scale economies.14
These results provide us with the following testable hypothesis: Everything
else equal, a higher level of external finance  results in  a higher export share
and trade balance of goods that have relatively high scale economies.
3  Financial  Development  and  Manufactured
Trade  in  a  30-Year  Panel
This section assesses the hypothesis  from the theoretical  model in a 30-year
panel of 65 countries.  As in the theoretical  model, we will focus on manufac-
tured  goods as the  goods with  increasing  returns  to  scale and  intrasectoral
trade,  for two reasons. First,  this  is a standard  assumption  in international
trade theory"5 and empirical evidence supports  that  at least some of the man-
ufacturing  industries  have increasing  returns  to  scale." 6 Second,  our model
focuses on scale economies due to  increasing  returns  in capital.  While other
16sectors  such  as  agriculture  and  natural  resources  might  also  exhibit  scale
economies, these are mostly due to  increasing returns  in land or labor.17
We will therefore  focus on the  causal link between financial development
and  the trade  in manufactured  goods. This  section first describes the  data.
We then present results from cross-country regressions of manufactured  trade
on financial development. Finally, we discuss results  from panel estimations.
3.1  The  Data
The sample consists of data for 65 countries over the period 1966 and 1995. In
the following we describe the measures of financial development  and trade  in
manufactured  goods as well as the variables included in the set of conditioning
information.
Since the  model  concentrates  on the  mobilization  of savings  and the  al-
location of these resources to  the private  sector as the main  function  of the
financial sector, we would like to  use a  corresponding  measure  of financial
development.  Since there  are  no  such  accurate  and  comparable  indicators
available for a large  cross-country  sample  and  over a longer time-span,  we
have to rely on a proxy variable. We will use PRIVATE  CREDIT,  which is
defined as  credit  to  the  private  sector  by deposit  money banks  and  other
financial institutions  as a share  of GDP  as our  main  indicator  of financial
development." 8 Although  it measures  only part  of the  mobilized savings, it
measures  the  part  that  is channeled  to  private  firms. Although  it  is not  a
direct  measure  of efficiency, it  captures  part  of it,  since it  excludes  credit
to  the  private  sector by  the  central  bank,  assuming  that  the  latter  is less
efficient than  private  intermediaries  in allocating  resources.19
17Although the theoretical  model makes predictions  only about  exports  and
the trade  balance in manufactured  goods, we will use manufactured  imports
as an additional  trade  indicator,  both  as a robustness  check and  to  test  for
the  validity of alternative  hypotheses.  We will use two groups of measures
that  capture  the size of exports  and imports in manufactured  goods. The first
group comprises real manufactured  exports,  imports  and  the  difference be-
tween both relative to real GDP. The second group consists of manufactured
exports  and manufactured  imports relative to total  merchandise  exports  and
total  merchandise imports,  respectively. 20
Table  1 presents  descriptive statistics  and  correlations  between  the vari-
ables. There is considerable variation  in PRIVATE CREDIT,  ranging from a
low of 5% in Ghana to  a high of 146% in Switzerland.  Manufactured  exports
also show substantial  variation across countries. Whereas  Rwanda's  share of
manufactured  exports  in  GDP  was 0.04%, Belgium's  share  was 42%. Simi-
larly, Nigeria's share  of manufactured  exports  in total  merchandise  exports
was 0.5%, whc: eas Japan's  share  was 95%. There  is a  positive  and  highly
significant  correlation  between  PRIVATE  CREDIT  and  manufactured  ex-
ports  in  both  GDP  and  in total  merchandise  exports  and  the  ratio  of the
manufactured  trade  balance to GDP.
To assess the  strength  of an independent  link between  financial develop-
ment and trade  in manufactured  goods we include  a set of control variables.
To control  for the  effect of distortionary  governmental  policies  on both  fi-
nancial development and international  trade  we use the black  market  pre-
mium.2"  We include the log of the initial  level  of real  per  capita  GDP
to  control for a causal link from the income  level to  trade.  We use the  ini-
18tial  real  capital  per  capita  to  control  for capital  deepening. Finally, the
growth  rate  of  terms  of  trade  and  total  population  are included  as
exogenous determinants  of the trade  shares. We expect  countries with a pos-
itive growth rate  of terms  of trade  to experience  a larger trade  balance  and
larger countries to have lower export  and  import  shares.
3.2  Financial  Development  and  Manufactured  Trade
in  a Cross-Section  of  Countries
The pure  cross-sectional  analysis uses data  averaged over  1966-95, so that
there  is one observation  per  country. Specifically, we estimate  the following
regression:22
MANUF,  = ajFINANCE 1 + a2CV, + ei  (28)
where FINANCE  is PRIVATE CREDIT,  MANUF  is one of the five indi-
cators of trade  in manufactured  goods, CV  is the  set of conditioning  infor-
mation,  and  e is the white-noise error.
We present  results  using  both  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  and  In-
strumental  Variables  (IV)  techniques.  Specifically, we use the  legal origin
of countries  to  extract  the  exogenous component  of financial  development.
This  allows us to  control for the  possibility  of reverse causality  from manu-
factured trade  to financial development. La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and  Vishny (1997, 1998) have shown that  the  legal origin of a country  ma-
terially  influences  its  legal treatment  of creditors  and  shareholders,  its  ac-
counting standards  and the efficiency of contract  enforcement, which in turn
19determine the efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets. Furthermore,
since most  countries  have acquired  their  legal origin through  occupation  or
colonization during the 19th century, we can regard legal origin as exogenous
variable. We use the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions  to  assess
whether the instrumental  variables  are associated  with  manufactured  trade
beyond their  correlation  with financial development  or the  other regressors.
The  regression  specification  "passes"  the  test  if we cannot  reject  the  null
hypothesis  that  the instruments  are not correlated  with  the error  terms.
The  results  in  Table  2 indicate  that  countries  with  higher  levels of fi-
nancial  development  experience  larger  export  shares  and  trade  balances  in
manufactured  goods. PRIVATE CREDIT  enters significantly positive in the
regressions of manufactured  exports  and trade  balance. While  it also enters
significantly positive  in  the regressions  of manufactured  imports,  the  coef-
ficient is  less than  half the  size as  in the  regression  of the  export  share.
While  PRIVATE  CREDIT  enters significantly  positive  in the  regression  of
the  share  of manufactured  exports  in total  merchandise  exports,  its  coeffi-
cient is insignificant in the regression of the  share of manufactured  imports
in total  merchandise  imports.
The results  in Table 3 confirm our previous  findings and show that  these
results  are not due to  reverse causality  or simultaneity  bias. Using the legal
origin as instrument  for PRIVATE CREDIT,  we find a strong impact of PRI-
VATE CREDIT  on the share  of manufactured  exports  in  GDP  and in total
merchandise exports  and on the trade  balance of manufactured  goods relative
to  GDP. The Hansen test  of the overidentifying restrictions  indicate that  we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that  the instruments  are not correlated with
20the error terms. Controlling for reverse causality and simultaneity  bias, we do
not  only confirm the significance of our results,  but  we find an even stronger
impact of financial development on manufactured  trade,  as evidenced by the
larger coefficient size in the IV regressions compared to the OLS regressions.
PRIVATE CREDIT  does not enter significantly in the regression of the share
of manufactured  imports  in GDP  and total  merchandise imports.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 are not only statistically  significant, but also
of economic importance.  A 10% higher value of PRIVATE CREDIT  implies
a 16% higher export share  and  a 14% higher trade  balance in manufactured
goods as share  of GDP. To illustrate  the economic importance  consider Ar-
gentina. Its share of manufactured  exports  in GDP during  1966-95 was 1.5%,
while PRIVATE CREDIT  had  a value of 16%. An exogenous increase  in fi-
nancial  development  to  the  sample mean  of 40% would  have resulted  in a
share of manufactured  exports  in GDP of 6.5%. Similarly, Argentina's  share
of manufactured  exports  in total  merchandise exports  would have been 64%
instead  of the actual  23%.23
3.3  Financial  Development  and  Manufactured  Trade
in a Panel
While the cross-country regressions help us determine  whether cross-country
variation  in financial development  can help explain  cross-country  variation
in international  trade  patterns,  we would also like to  exploit the  time-series
variation of the data.  Furthermore,  panel analysis allows us, unlike the cross-
sectional  analysis,  to  control  for biases  due to  unobserved  country-specific
effects. We therefore  split our sample into six non-overlapping  5-year periods
21and estimate  the following regression:
MANUFi,t  = QiFINANCEi,t  + ca 2CVi,t + Ai + At  + Ei,t  (29)
where p  and A are country- and  time-specific effects, respectively, and i  and
t  represent  country  and  time  period,  respectively. In the  following, we will
first describe the econometric  techniques  used to estimate  (29) and then  the
results.
3.3.1  The  Econometric  Model
To estimate  (29) we use the  Generalized-Methods-of-Moments  (GMM) es-
timators  proposed  by Holtz-Eakin,  Newey and  Rosen (1988), Arellano  and
Bond (1991) and Arellano and  Bover (1995). Arellano and Bond (1991) pro-
pose to first-difference (29) to eliminate the country-specific effect. To address
the  endogeneity  problem,  they  propose  using lagged values of the  levels of
the  regressors as instruments.  Assuming  (a)  that  there  is no serial correla-
tion in the error terms  Ei,t,  and  (b) that  the explanatory  variables are weakly
exogenous, we can use the following moment  conditions:
E[(Ei,t -Ei,t_  )X,t]  0  j  = 2, ..., t - 1;  t = 3, ..., T  (30)
where X  [FINANCE  CV].  We will refer to this estimator  as the differ-
ence estimator.
The  difference estimator,  however, eliminates  the cross-country  variation
of our data. 24 To address this conceptual disadvantage and econometric short-
coming of the  difference estimator  we use an alternative  estimator  that  com-
bines  in a system  the regressions in differences with  regressions in levels, as
22proposed  by Arellano  and Bover  (1995).25 Blundell  and  Bond  (1998) show
that  this  system  estimator  reduces the  potential  biases  and  imprecision as-
sociated  with  the  difference estimator  and  performs  better  in Monte  Carlo
simulations. The instruments  for the regressions in differences are the same as
above. For the regressions in levels, lagged differences are used as instruments.
The latter  are valid instruments  under  the  following assumption:  Although
there  might  be  a  correlation  between  i  and  the  levels of the  explanatory
variables, this  correlation  is constant  over time.  The moment  conditions  for
the regressions in levels are thus:26
E[(Xi,t_j-Xt_j_1)(Ei,t  +  J] = O  j  = 2,...,t-1;  t =3,  ...,T  (31)
The system thus  consists of the stacked regressions in differences and lev-
els, with the moment conditions in (30) applied to the first part of the system,
the regressions in differences, and the  moment  conditions  in  (31) applied to
the second part  of the system, the regressions in levels.
The consistency of the GMM estimator  depends  on the validity of the as-
sumption that  e does not  exhibit serial correlation  and  on the validity of the
instruments.  We use two tests  proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test
for these assumptions.  The first  is a  Sargan  test  of over-identifying restric-
tions, which tests  for the overall validity of the instruments  by analyzing the
sample analog of the  moment  conditions  used in the  estimation  procedure.
The second test  examines the assumption  of no serial correlation  in the error
terms.  It  tests  whether the  differenced error  terms are second-order serially
correlated.  27 Failure to reject the null hypotheses  of both tests  gives support
to the model.
233.3.2  The  Results
The results in Table 4 confirm the results  from our cross-country  estimations.
The results  show a statistically  significant and economically large causal im-
pact of PRIVATE CREDIT  on manufactured  exports  as share of GDP and as
share of total  merchandise exports  and on the trade  balance of manufactured
goods to  GDP. While  PRIVATE  CREDIT  also enters  significantly  positive
in the regressions of manufactured  imports  as share  of GDP, the  impact  of
PRIVATE CREDIT  on exports  is more than  twice as big as the impact  on
imports.  Financial  development  seems to  have a negative  effect on the  rel-
ative  importance  of manufactured  imports.  The specification  tests  indicate
that  the data  do not reject the assumption of no serial correlation in the error
terms and the validity of the instruments  at the 10% level, except for the re-
gression of manufactured  imports  as share of total  merchandise  imports. We
note that  the coefficients are of smaller size than  in the cross-country  IV re-
gressions and more in line with the cross-country OLS regressions. This might
indicate that  the short-term  impact of PRIVATE CREDIT  on manufactured
trade  is smaller  than  its  long-run impact.28
3.4  Robustness  Tests
Table 5 presents  the regression results  using total  merchandise  exports  and
imports  as dependent  variables. If the  hypothesis  from the theoretical  model
holds,  the  link between  total  exports  and  financial  development  should be
less pronounced  than  between manufactured  exports  and financial develop-
ment.  The results  in Table  5 indicate  a causal  impact  of financial  develop-
24ment on total  merchandise exports,  while there  does not  seem to be a robust
relationship  between  financial  development  and  total  merchandise  imports
and  trade  balance.  While the  results  for imports  and  trade  balance  in the
panel regressions are significant - and negative in the case of the merchandise
trade  balance -, the cross-country  regressions do not yield significant results.
Overall,  these  results  indicate  that  the  impact  of PRIVATE  CREDIT  on
manufactured  exports  and the manufactured  trade  balance is not  driven by
a high correlation  between manufactured  exports  and total  exports.
Our results  are  not  driven  by the  historic  experience  of the  East  Asian
countries. 29 Leaving out  the  East  Asian countries  does not  change the  size
and significance of the coefficients of financial development.
Our  results  are robust  to  the  use  of other  measures  of financial  devel-
opment.  Specifically, we use LIQUID LIABILITIES,  the  liquid liabilities of
the financial system  (currency plus demand and interest-bearing  liabilities of
banks and  nonbank  intermediaries)  divided by GDP, and  COMMERCIAL-
CENTRAL BANK, the ratio  of commercial bank  domestic assets divided by
the domestic assets of commercial and central banks. 30 Using both  indicators
we find a strong  positive  impact  of financial development  on manufactured
exports  as share  of GDP  and  as share  of total  exports,  and  on the  trade
balance of manufactured  goods in GDP. 31
4  Concluding  Remarks
This paper explored the link between the level of financial development  and
the  structure  of international  trade.  A theoretical  model  with  two sectors
25showed one possible  causal  link from  the  level of financial  development  to
the  structure  of the  trade  balance.  The  sector  with  high  scale  economies
profits  more  from  a  higher  level  of financial  development  than  the  other
sector.  Economies with  a better-developed  financial sector therefore  have a
comparative  advantage  in  sectors  with  high  scale economies  and,  all  else
equal, are net exporters  of them.
Estimation  results  from  a  30-year panel  with  65 countries  give support
to  the  predictions  of the  model.  Countries  with  a higher  level of financial
development have higher shares of manufactured  exports in GDP and in total
merchandise exports and have a higher trade balance in manufactured  goods.
These results  are consistent  across cross-country  and panel  estimations.
This paper's  results underline  the importance  of financial development for
economic development by looking beyond  the link between finance and  eco-
nomic growth. This  raises the importance  that  financial development  should
have on policy makers' agendas.
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301 See among others  Barro and Lee (1994) and Easterly,  Loayza, and Mon-
tiel  (1997).
2 For financial  development,  see  Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck  (2000), for
openness see FRankel and Romer (1999).
3 The  model  builds  on  a model  developed  by Khan  (1999). The  model
presented in this paper  also owes much to Helpman  (1981).
4  Interest  rate  changes therefore  do  not  affect  the  saving  decisions of
agents. This  allows us to  isolate  the  effects of financial development  on the
loan  market.  Empirical  evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that  saving  de-
cisions  are  independent  of interest  rate  changes, see  for example  Loayza,
Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven (1998) and  Beck, Levine and  Loayza (2000).
5 We use food  and  manufactured  goods to  denote  the  two  goods as in
Helpman  (1981), one of the first  models with inter- and intra-sectoral  trade.
6 We could use any other utility function, as long as it implies a downward
sloping relative demand  curve.
7 Assuming a more general distribution  function  requires additional  func-
tional  assumptions  to get the  same results.
8 Due  to  the  concavity  of their  utility  functions,  entrepreneurs  will al-
ways insure themselves  fully, if offered fair insurance.  The lack of insurance
arrangements  would change the  optimal  debt  contract  as  described  below
while retaining  its main characteristics.  See Khan  (1999) for a discussion.
9 See Townsend (1979) and  Gale and  Hellwig (1985).
10 For  a  formal  derivation,  see  appendix,  available on  request.  We use
,  which is the  gross interest  rate  times  the  loan share  in total  investment,
instead  of the gross interest  rate,  since this  facilitates  the  derivation  of the
31contract. As shown in the appendix, the maximization  problem can be rewrit-
ten so that  - is the only decision variable, instead  of both  loan interest  rate
and loan size, as in the usual set-up. This is comparable  to Townsend's (1979)
derivation of the optimal  contract  and  follows Khan  (1999).
11 For  a  formal derivation,  see appendix.  The  start-up  costs  T  do not
enter the  optimal-debt  problem since they have to be paid entirely by man-
ufacturing  producers  before entering  the loan market.
12 Due to  the insurance  arrangement  all entrepreneurs  face the  same ex-
post costs.
13 We assume that  any variety yj can be transformed  into another  variety
without costs, so that  the insurance arrangements  guarantee  all manufactur-
ing producers  the expected revenues.
14 Compare Krugman  (1980).
15 See Young (1928) and Krugman  and  Obstfeld  (1997), ch.6.
16 See  Junius  (1997) for an  overview. Basu  and  Fernald  (1997) report
larger scale economies for manufacturing  than for the whole U.S. private econ-
omy, after controlling for aggregation effects. Antweiler and Trefler (2000) use
international  trade  data  to  show that  while there  are manufacturing  indus-
tries with both  constant  and increasing returns to scale, most natural  resource
industries exhibit  either  constant  or very small increasing returns  to scale.
17 Engerman  and  Sokoloff (1997) describe  the  agricultural  activities  in
the  South of the  U.S. and  in  parts  of Latin  America  in the  17th  and  18th
centuries  as involving scale economies in slave labor.  Griliches  (1963) finds
increasing returns  to  scale in  U.S. agriculture.  Hayami  and  Ruttan  (1985)
report  increasing returns  to scale for agriculture  in developed  countries and
32constant  returns  in developing  countries. Kislev  and  Peterson  (1986), how-
ever, show that  the estimates  for the  developed countries  are not  robust  to
the  use of country  dummies.  Furthermore,  they  cite other  evidence against
the existence of scale economies in U.S. agriculture.
18 Specifically, we take  lines 22d+42d  from the  IFS,  divided by the end-
of-period CPI. The  GDP  numbers  are deflated by the yearly  CPI. To avoid
inconsistency  when using a ratio  of a stock and  a flow variable, we take the
average of period t  and  period  t-1 of the  financial variable and  divide it by
the real GDP of period t.
19 This or similar  measures  have also been used by other  researchers as
an indicator  of the  level of financial development,  as by Levine and  Zervos
(1998) and Levine, Loayza and  Beck (2000).
20 All data  on trade  in manufactured  goods are from the World Develop-
ment Indicators,  while the GDP  numbers are from Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-
Hebbel  and  Serven  (1998).  Since the  data  on  manufactured  trade  are  in
current  U.S. dollars, they  cannot  be  deflated by a price index in  local cur-
rency, such as the GDP deflator or the CPI. We therefore  calculate an export
(import)  deflator  from  data  provided  by the  World Bank,  as ratio  of total
merchandise exports  (imports)  in current  and in constant  US dollars.
21 This  variable  measures  the  percentage  deviation  of the  black market
exchange rate  from the official exchange rate.
22 Both  FINANCE  and  MANUF  are included  in logs, so that  the re-
sults can be interpreted  as elasticities. The trade  balance is calculated as the
difference of the logs of manufactured  exports  and  imports.
23 We use the results  in Table  3 for these  policy experiments  since they
33control for possible reverse causality and simultaneity  bias. Using the results
from Table 2 would yield similar though smaller effects of PRIVATE CREDIT
on manufactured  trade.
24 This has been criticized,  among others,  by Durlauf  and  Quah  (1999).
25 Among the  other  problems with  the  difference estimator  are that  (1)
lagged levels are weak instruments  for a regression in differences, when the ex-
planatory  and the dependent  variables are persistent  over time, which is most
likely the  case here;  (2) differences are less correlated  over time  than  levels
which might produce biased estimates  if the dynamic structure  of estimated
model differs from the true model (see Barro  1997); and  (3) first-differencing
tends  to emphasize measurement  error over signal.
26 Only the latest  possible first differences are used in the respective level
regression,  since using  prior  differences would lead  to  redundant  moment
conditions, as shown by Arellano and  Bover (1995).
27 By construction  the  differenced error-term  is likely to  be  first-order
serially  correlated.  We cannot  use  the  error  terms  from  the  regressions  in
levels since they include the  country-specific effect.
28 The  results  are  based  on  the  second-stage  estimations  that  control
for heterogeneity  in the variance-covariance matrix.  However, Arrellano  and
Bond  (1991) and  Blundell and  Bond  (1998) point out  that  the standard  er-
rors of the  second-stage  results  might  be  biased downwards.  We therefore
also  consider the  first-stage  results.  The  results  on  the  first-stage  confirm
a significantly positive  impact  of PRIVATE  CREDIT  on manufactured  ex-
ports  as share of GDP and as share of total  merchandise exports  and on the
manufactured  trade  balance as share  of GDP.
3429 Specifically, we eliminated  Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Philippines  and
Thailand  from the sample. Results  available on request.
30  These  measures  have  been  used  by  other  researchers,  for  example,
Levine, Loayza, and  Beck (2000).
31 Results  available on request.
35Table 1: Summary Statistics:  1966-1995
Descriptive  Statistics
Private  Manufactured Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  Exports/ Manufactured  lmportsl
Credit  Exports  / GDP  Imports  / GDP Trade  Balance  / GDP  Total  Exports  Total Imports
Mean  39.92  8.03  16.13  -8.10  38.01  65.69
Median  27.51  3.85  14.16  -7.36  31.44  66.99
Maximum  146.41  42.02  59.92  8.37  94.82  82.65
Minimum  4.93  0.04  2.98  -32.85  0.47  29.24
Std. Dev.  30.68  9.03  9.61  8.16  28.52  9.49
Countries  65  65  65  65  65  65
Correlations
Private  Manufactured Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  Exports/ Manufactured  Imports/
Credit  Exports  Imports  Trade  Balance  Total  Exports  Total Imports
Private  Credit  1
Manufactured  Exports  I GDP  0.550  1
(0.001)
Manufactured  Imports/ GDP  0.135  0.618  1
(0.286)  (0.001)
Manufactured  Trade  Balance  I GOP  0.450  0.378  -0.494  1
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)
Manufactured  Exports/  0.672  0.754  0.182  0.620  1
Total  Exports  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.147)  (0.001)
Manufactured  Imports/  -0.152  -0.101  0.239  -0.393  -0.391  1
Total  Imports  (0.228)  (0.423)  (0.055)  (0.001)  (0.001)
p-values  are reported  in parenthesesTable 2: The Link Between Finance and Manufactured  Trade in a 30 Year Cross-Section, OLS
Dependent variable  Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured exports/  Manufactured imports/
exports / GDP  imports / GDP  trade balance  I GDP  total exports  total imports
Constant  -2.218  2.544  -4.762  0.476  4.231
(0.030)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.556)  (0.001)
Private credit'  0.957  0.395  0.562  0.572  -0.097
(0.004)  (0.025)  (0.044)  (0.031)  (0.133)
Total population'  -0.140  -0.297  0.157  0.077  -0.030
(0.057)  (0.001)  (0.053)  (0.313)  (0.045)
Growth rate of terms of trade  0.007  0.006  0.001  -0.079  -0.006
(0.938)  (0.924)  (0.993)  (0.509)  (0.795)
Initial income per capita'  -0.373  -0.037  -0.336  -0.300  0.037
(0.191)  (0.780)  (0.280)  (0.288)  (0.354)
Black market premiUM2  -0.951  0.487  -1.437  -1.360  -0.057
(0.144)  (0.174)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.569)
Initial real capital per capital  0.451  -0.048  0.499  0.375  0.010
(0.063)  (0.630)  (0.062)  (0.129)  (0.804)
Heteroskedasticity robust p-values are reported in parentheses
R 2 0.590  0.486  0.564  0.506  0.177
Countries  65  65  65  65  65
In the regression, this variable is included as log(variable)
2 In the regression, this variable is included as log(1 + variable)Table 3: The Link Between Finance and Manufactured Trade in a 30 Year Cross-Section, IV
Dependent  variable  Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  exports/  Manufactured imports/
exports  / GDP  imports / GDP  trade  balance / GDP  total exports  total imports
Constant  -2.919  2.391  -5.459  -0.083  4.121
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.908)  (0.001)
Private  credit'  1.596  0.551  1.353  1.116  -0.057
(0.001)  (0.191)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.698)
Total population  -0.193  -0.305  0.115  0.029  -0.025
(0.018)  (0.001)  (0.153)  (0.666)  (0.057)
Growth  rate of terms of trade  -0.004  -0.039  0.004  -0.094  -0.015
(0.963)  (0.535)  (0.970)  (0.382)  (0.392)
Initial income  per capital  -0.465  -0.097  -0.472  -0.374  0.047
(0.089)  (0.384)  (0.121)  (0.167)  (0.140)
Black market  premium 2 -0.264  0.218  -0.678  -0.824  -0.028
(0 720)  (0.751)  (0.268)  (0.152)  (0.870)
Initial real capital per capital  0.347  -0.038  0.365  0.279  -0.004
(0.142)  (0.796)  (0.140)  (0.220)  (0.932)
Heteroskedasticity  robust p-values  are reported  in parentheses
Hansen-test  of OIR 3 0.283  2.573  1.033  0.310  0.716
Countries  65  65  65  65  65
'In  the regression,  this variable is included  as log(variable)
2 In the regression,  this variable is included  as log(1 + variable)
3The  null hypothesis is that the instrumental  variables are not correlated  with the error terms. The critical values (2 d.f.) are: 10%:  4.61, 5%: 5.99Table 4: The Link Between  Finance  and Manufactured  Trade  in a 30 Year  Panel
Dependent  variable  Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  Manufactured  exports/ Manufactured  imports/
exports  / GDP  imports  / GDP  trade balance  I GDP  total exports  total imports
Constant  -3.621  2.219  -5.565  -0.748  4.262
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Private  credit'  0.795  0.351  0.414  0.488  -0.029
(0.00  1)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0°001)  (0.004)
Total  population'  -0.123  -0.298  0.162  0.076  -0.048
(0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.001)
Growth  rate  of  terms  of  trade  0.017  0.011  0.002  0.003  0.005
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.655)  (0.042)  (0.001)
Initial  income  per  capita'  0.362  0.495  -0.072  -0.092  0.005
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.587)  (0.370)  (0.878)
Black  market  premium 2 -0.448  0.064  -0.652  -0.835  -0.094
(0.001)  (0.231)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Initial  real  capital  per  capita'  -0.063  -0.559  0.418  0.367  -0.001
(0.432)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.966)
Heteroskedasticity  robust  p-values  are  reported  in parentheses
Sargan  test 3 (p-value)  0.225  0.217  0.259  0.248  0.274
Serial  correlation  test 4 (p-value)  0.821  0.267  0.362  0.988  0.060
Countries  65  65  65  65  65
Observations  272  272  272  272  272
1In the regression,  this  variable  is  included  as log(variable)
2 In  the  regression,  this  variable  is included  as log(1  + variable)
3 The  null  hypothesis  is  that  the  instruments  used  are  not  correlated  with  the  residuals.
4The  null  hypothesis  is  that  the  errors  in the first-difference  regression  exhibit  no second-order  serial  correlation.Table  5:  The Unk Between  Finance  and  Merchandise  Trade
Cross-Section  Panel
Dependent  variable  Merchandise Merchandise  Merchandise  trade  Merchandise Merchandise Merchandise  trade
exports  / GDP  imports  / GDP  balance  / GDP  exports  / GDP imports  / GDP  balance  / GDP
Constant  -2.920  -1.484  -1.221  1.732  2.625  -0.861
(0.001)  (0 001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Private  credit'  0.463  0.457  0.045  0.244  0.370  -0.146
(0.018)  (0.052)  (0.718)  (0.001)  (O.OOt)  (0.001)
Total  population'  -0.225  -0.273  0.030  -0.189  -0.256  0.032
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.321)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Growth  rate  of terms  of  trade  0.069  0.002  0.067  0.010  0.007  0.002
(0.178)  (0.972)  (0.043)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.051)
Initial  income  per  capital  -0.025  -0.150  0.024  0.457  0.465  0.011
(0.836)  (0.159)  (0.794)  (0.001)  (0.00)J  (0.880)
Black  market  premium 2 0.425  0.056  0.018  0.347  0.161  0.163
(0.335)  (0.914)  (0.920)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)
Initial  real capital  per  capita'  0.023  0.009  0.074  -0.405  -0.537  0.116
(0.804)  (0.924)  (0.331)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.042)
Heteroskedasticity  robust  p-values  are  reported  in parentheses
Hansen-test  of OIR3 0.896  2.232  2.923
Sargan  test 4 (p-value)  0.209  0.376  0.174
Serial  correlation  teste  (p-value)  0.523  0.429  0.228
Countries  65  65  65  65  65  65
Observations  272  272  272
'In  the regression,  this  variable  is  included  as  log(variable)
2 In  the regression,  this  variable  is included  as  1og(1  + variable)
3 The  null hypothesis  is that  the  instrunmental  variables  are  not  correlated  with  the  error  terms.  The  critical  values  (2 d.f.)  are:  10%:  4.61,  5%:  5.99
4 The  null hypothesis  is that  the  instruments  used  are not  correlated  with  the  residuals.
5  The  null hypothesis  is that  the  errors  in the  first-difference  regression  exhibit  no second-order  serial  correlation.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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